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Japan's Judicial System May Change,
But Its Fundamental Nature Stays
Virtually the Same?
Recent Japanese Reforms on the Judicial
Appointment and Evaluation
By TAKAYUKI 11*

I. Introduction
The restructuring of Japan's judicial system was a key reform in
the early 21st century. In order to secure an independent judiciary
and maintain a supply of high-quality judges, the Justice System
Reform Council (hereinafter JSRC, 1999-2001) proposed a set of
important measures and new recommendations. Specific reforms
have focused on efforts to: diversify the sources of supply of judges,
introduce
procedures,
reappointment
judges'
reexamine
transparency into the personnel process, and to examine how
Supreme Court Justices should be properly appointed. These
reforms are quite profound, especially since the last significant
reforms took place over half a century ago after World War II.
The purpose of this paper then is to evaluate both the successes
and failures of the JSRC's proposed reform of the judicial
appointment system and to assess judicial performance in Japan.
Japanese lower court judges have long been characterized and
ostracized for their largely subservient role to the Supreme Court
The Secretariat evaluates their performance and
Secretariat.
appointment (or reappointment) for judicial service, the latter of
* Takayuki Ii is an associate professor of law at Hirosaki University, Japan. The
author is grateful to Professor Setsuo Miyazawa and the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law for their generous support to his presentation at the
symposium that celebrated the 10th anniversary of Japanese judicial reforms, and
appreciates Professor Hiroshi Fukurai for proofreading the manuscript of this
paper.
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which often results in arbitrary transfers of individual judges to
remote district courts. The overwhelming authority of the Supreme
Court in this decision-making process often leaves Japanese judges
with the disgraceful title of "mere employees of centralized
bureaucratic judicial agencies."' Likewise, Supreme Court justices
have also often been criticized for their conservative views, passive
decision-making practices, and infrequent exercises of judicial
review on constitutional issues. 2 The central question addressed in
this paper is the following: Have the JSRC's suggested reforms on
judicial selection and evaluation actually altered the Japanese
judiciary?
The method of analysis adopted is a socio-legal approach that
critically analyzes the judicial appointment and evaluation system
as well as its respective informal practices. We cannot discern the
content of the law and its concomitant legal institutions by looking
at them abstractly. To truly identify the content of the law and its
institutions, we must look to the actual practice of law. For instance,
Article 80 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that the judges of
the lower courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of
persons nominated by the Supreme Court. Yet, in reality, nearly all
of the judicial nominees suggested by the Supreme Court have
almost always been confirmed by the Japanese Cabinet like
clockwork and its appointment power might become merely a
decoration. Likewise, judicial legislation such as the Court Act,
which stipulates that a judge shall not be transferred to a different
court against his will, does not guarantee the independence of
judges. In reality, any attempt by a judge to resist the Court's
directive for his transfer will certainly damage his future career
prospects.3
The structure of this paper is as follows. After tracing the
history of Japan's judicial system in the post-WWII period in Section
1. See Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND
266 (Philip C. S. Lewis ed., 1994).
2. The Supreme Court has declared the statutes to be unconstitutional only
eight times so far (as of November 2012). Concerning the possible impact of the
judicial appointment reform on judicial review, see Takayuki li, Japanese Way of
Judicial Appointment and Its Impact on Judicial Review, 5 NAT'L TAIWAN U. L. REv. 73
(2010).
3. See Miyazawa, supra note 1, at 266. Judges are transferred nationwide
almost every three years and the pace of increase in salary compensation varies
among judges after almost 20 years of practice (there are 24 gradations of salary
differentials among Japanese judges).
TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY
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II, the paper examines the content of JSRC's judicial reforms in the
early 21st century in Section III, followed by the impact of the
reforms on the Japanese judiciary in Section IV.
II. Japan's Judge System After World War II
A. Overview
Under the 1889 Japanese Constitution and the 1890 Court
Organization Act, the judicial organ was part of the Ministry of
Justice, and the Emperor appointed judges for life. Judicial
independence with broadened power and jurisdiction was not
codified until the 1947 Constitution and the 1947 Court Act
following World War II.
The judicial appointment system was modified accordingly.
Under today's postwar Constitution, lower court judges are to be
appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the
Supreme Court. The term of office for lower court judges is ten
years with the privilege of reappointment until the retirement age of
65, excluding summary court judges with the retirement age of 70.4
The Cabinet also appoints Supreme Court Justices, and the
Emperor specifically appoints the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court after nomination by the Cabinet. The public reviews their
appointment at the first general election for the House of
Representatives, and again at the first general election for the House
of Representatives after ten years of the former election. They will
also be reviewed periodically in the same manner thereafter. 5
The Justice Appointment Consultation Commission was
established in 1947 for the initial nomination of the Supreme Court
Justices, but it was soon dissolved. 6 This nomination and
appointment system might have been influenced by the merit-based
selection of state judges in the U.S., where the initial nomination of
judges must rely on the objective assessment of merits, capabilities,
and competencies of judicial candidates after they are screened by
the judicial nominating commission, the members of which include
both legal practitioners and non-lawyers, all of whom are subject to
retention election at the end of their appointment terms.
4. JAPAN CONST. art. 80, English translation available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/
constitution/e/etc/cOl.html#s6.
5. JAPAN CONST. art. 79.
6. li, supranote 2, at 88.
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In Japan, judicial officers consist of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court (1), Justices of the Supreme Court (14), presidents of
the high court (8), lower court judges (1,782), assistant judges
(1,000), and summary court judges (806). New assistant judges are
appointed from those who have completed their judicial training at
the Legal Training and Research Institute (LTRI). These assistant
judges can participate in adjudication as a member of a collegiate
panel for they are not qualified to sit alone on the bench. At the
present time, however, a special law authorizes jurists who have
served as an assistant judge for at least five years, after having been
nominated by the Supreme Court, to sit alone as a special assistant
judge. 7
Judges in Japan are also required to engage in practical affairs
as assistant judges, public prosecutors, or practicing attorneys, etc.
for at least 10 years. At present, judges are likely to have been
appointed from those who have served as assistant judges for at
least ten years in the government. There is also a separate system
where judges are appointed from a pool of practicing attorneys.
B. The Procedureof JudicialAppointment
1. Lower Court Judges
The number of judicial appointments made by the Cabinet has
been nearly the same as the number of judicial nominees submitted
by the Supreme Court. The number of judicial candidates placed on
the nomination list by the Supreme Court was just one more than
the total number of judicial vacancies, and as a result, all but one
nominee has been always accepted by the Cabinet. This practice is
seen to be the de facto power of the Supreme Court in judicial
appointment. Otherwise, judicial nominations by the Supreme
Court might be conducted with undue influence from the Cabinet
(Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)), which was demonstrated in the
infamous non-renomination of Assistant Judge Yasuaki Miyamoto
in 1971.8
7. Id. at 91.
8. Assistant Judge Miyamoto once belonged to the progressive Young
Lawyers League (seihyokyo). Though he was recommended for reappointment and
promotion to full judge by the Supreme Court, the Cabinet denied his
reappointment in 1971, showing a heavy-handed political influence on the
appointment of Japan's judges. See JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW
6-108 (1998).
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The process by which the Supreme Court nominates judicial
candidates is not necessarily clear or transparent from a non-legal
standpoint. The materials used for the evaluation of potential
judicial nominees are also often quite obscure. In the case of
appointing new assistant judges from LTRI graduates, final
decisions were made on the basis of the following: (1) final
examination grades, (2) student evaluations, and (3) results of
interviews with chief judges of the General Secretariat of the
The number of candidates who were not
Supreme Court.
nominated totaled 59 between 1970 and 2002.9 In terms of the
reappointment to full judges from assistant judgeships and judicial
officerships, the materials and criteria used are still largely
unknown. Compared to the number of LTRI applicants, there were
only three non-nominees among judge applicants from 1970 to 2002.
Indeed, nearly all assistant judges and judicial officers have been
appointed to full judges.'0 In the case of the judicial appointment of
practicing attorneys, materials and specific criteria used for the
evaluation are unclear. But the total number of candidates selected
from the pool of practicing attorneys is relatively few, compared to
LTRI graduates or judge applicants."
2. Supreme Court Justices
Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the Cabinet after
The list of
hearing opinions from the Court's Chief Justice.
candidates selected by the Chief Justice is submitted to the Cabinet
Council through the Prime Minister's judgment on the basis of the
opinions of the Chief Justice, other judges, attorneys and public
prosecutors. The list may also be altered by the Cabinet Secretary
based on the opinions of other personnel who have experience in
administrative and foreign affairs.12
Much like the appointment of lower court judges, the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices is not very transparent.
Judicial nominations are made in the following maner: six from
9. Ii, supra note 2, at 85 (see Table 1).
10. Id.
11. Id. Practicing attorney nominees consisted of mere 46 applicants from 1991
to 2001.
12. Naikaku Kanbou [Secretary of the Cabinet], Saikousai Saibankan no Ninmei
ni Tsuite [On the Appointment of the Supreme Court Justices] (paper presented at
the fifth meeting of the Daigokai Shihoseido Kaikaku Suishin Honbu Komon Kaigi
[Adviser Assembly of the Judicial Reform Promotion Office] (uly 5, 2002).
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judges, four from practicing attorneys, two from public prosecutors,
two from public servants (one of whom is female), and one
university law professor. Once they have been nominated and
chosen, the public review serves little practical purpose, as there has
never been a single dismissal of a nominated Justice.13
3. Judicial Evaluation
While there has been little legal basis or necessity for
conducting judicial evaluations, they were conducted informally
from the mid-1950s until the late 1990s. They were called a "report
on judges submitted by chief judges of the courts for making
transfer plans."14 There is no procedural mechanism to disclose the
content of judicial evaluations, or to facilitate the complaint whereby
a judge objects the court's directive to transfer to another court.
According to the Supreme Court's answer to the question by
the JSRC in 2000,15 the evaluation criteria of judges included: (I)
overall competency, such as: (1) the ability for disposing cases (e.g.,
accuracy, speed and disposition of the trial), (2) leadership skills and
expertise (e.g., adequacy of instructions to the staff and competency
as a presiding judge), and (3) legal knowledge and refined
adeptness (evaluated on the basis of three to four grade
estimations). Other criteria were: (II) general health (four grade
estimations), (III) overall character and ethical aptitude, and (IV)
abilities to render practical and analytical (or synthetic) judgments.
According to the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court, the
main purpose of judicial evaluations was to grasp the aptitude of
individual judges in their placements under the principle of "the
right man in the right place" and in the promotion of legal
education and judicial training.1 6

13. Ii, supra note 2, at 89-90.
14. THE PERSONNEL BUREAU OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE SUPREME COURT,
ANSWER TO THE QUESTION FROM THE JSRC 1 (July 31, 2000).
15. Id.
16. THE PERSONNEL BUREAU OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE SUPREME COURT,
PRESENT STATE OF JUDICIAL PERSONNEL EVALUATION AND THE GENERAL SITUATION OF
JUDICIAL PERSONNEL AFFAIRS 8 (Sept. 7, 2001).
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III. Early 21st Century Reforms
A. The Judge System
In terms of judge reform, there was the "Housou-ichigen"
proposal, suggesting the creation of a new and more expansive
nomination system to recruit and appoint judges from a greater pool
of legal practitioners and those who have been engaged in the legal
profession. The proposal was once rejected by the Special Justice
System Examinations Commission in the 1960s but was revived in
the 1990s.17 The revived one was attached importance in the JFBA's
movements toward judicial reform, which pursued "citizen's
judiciary."
It highlighted legal practitioners' business of
representing citizen clients and their familiarity with citizens. As a
consequence, the "Housou-ichigen" proposal played a crucial role to
advance judicial reform discussion which led to the establishment of
the JSRC.
On the other hand, the JSRC set a new reform agenda under the
title of the "Reform of the Judge System" after extended discussion
around the concept of "Housou-ichigen" in an effort to diversify
judges' backgrounds.18 The judge system was considered in line
with "a justice system that meets public expectations,"1 9 "the legal
profession supporting the justice system," 20 and the "establishment
of the popular base." 21 In other words, the re-shaping of the role of
Japan's justice system remained central to JSRC's proposals.

B. Reform Proposalsby the JSRC
Under the banner of "Judge System Reform," the JSRC
recommended numerous strategies and measures, as shown below,
in order to secure a stable supply of high-quality judges who will
17. See Takayuki Ii, Saibankan Seido Kaikaku no Rinen to Jitsuzou [Ideal and Real
Picture of the Judge System Reform], 5 SHIHOU KAIKAKU TYOUSASHITSU HOU [RESEARCH
OFFICE FOR JUDICIAL REFORM REVIEw] 5, 11 (2005).
18. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, Recommendations of the Justice System
Reform Council: For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, June 12, 2001,
available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612 report.html. See
Part 5. Reform of the Judge System, (1) Diversification of the Sources of Supply.
19. Id. See Chapter III Part 3 (2) (1) Construction of a Justice System Responding
to Public expectations: Coordination of the Institutional Base.
20. Id. See Chapter III Part 3 (2) (2) How the Legal Profession Supporting the
Justice System Should be: Expansion of the Human Base.
21. Id. See Chapter III Part 3 (2) (3) Establishment of the Popular Base.
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bear the responsibility to maintain both an equitable and
independent justice system in Japan.
1. Diversificationof the Sources of Supply
In order to diversify the source of potential judges, the JSRC
suggestions included strategies to: (1) better leverage assistant
judges' diverse experiences and backgrounds as legal professionals
prior to their appointment as judges; (2) terminate the Special
Assistant Judge System; (3) promote the appointment of practicing
lawyers; and (4) expand the Research Clerk System. 22 For example,
since district or high courts rarely use research clerks, the JSRC
suggested expanding the research clerk system to recruit from
outside the courts in order to provide recruits with invaluable
judiciary work experience. 23
2. Reexamination of Proceduresfor Appointment of Judges
The JSRC sought to create a consultation panel for nominating
lower court judges in order to restructure and introduce a more
equitable nomination and appointment system for judicial officers. 24
3. Reexamination of the Personnel System for Judges
The JSRC wanted to: (1) introduce a mechanism that will better
ensure transparency and objectivity of personnel evaluation that
serves as the basis for the personnel management in courts; and (2)
establish a corresponding equitable system for managing judge
salaries and compensation. 25
4. PopularParticipationin the Management of the Courts
In order to increase citizen participation in the management
and accountability of judicial institutions, the JSRC recommended
an expansion of the role of citizen volunteers in family court
councils and the district court councils. 26 For example, today's
22. Id. See Chapter III Part 5 Reform of the Judge System.
23. Id. See Chapter III Part 5 (1) (3) Expansion of the Research Clerk System at
the Courts.
24. Id. See Chapter III Part 5 (2) Reexamination of Procedures for Appointment
of Judges.
25. Id. See Chapter III Part 5 (3) Reexamination of the Personnel System for
Judges (Securing Transparency, Objectivity).
26. Id. See Chapter III Part 5 (4) Popular Participation in the Management of the
Courts.
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family court relies on an independent council to assess the proper
and equitable management of the court system. While such council
members included employees of local public institutions and those
endowed with special skills and knowledge, the JSRC suggests such
a council system should be adopted in other judicial institutions,
including regional district courts. People's views and outside
perspectives, according to the JSRC, should be reflected more
27
broadly in the management of the court system.
5. Appointment of Supreme Court Justices
Similar to the nomination and appointment of judicial officers
in Japanese courts, the JSRC also recommended the establishment of
appropriate measures for appointing jurists in the Japanese
Supreme Court. It argued that the new system of appointment must
be installed in order to: (1) ensure more transparency and objectivity
in their appointment; and to (2) increase the effectiveness of the
28
system for popular review by the Japanese citizenry.
6. Mutual Exchange with the Legal Profession
In order to mitigate the divisive nature of Japan's legal
landscape, the JSRC suggested the promotion of a mutual exchange
of personnel from professions. They include bureaucratic judges in
the judiciary, public prosecutors in the Ministry of Justice, practicing
lawyers in the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA), and
legal scholars. 29
These JSRC recommendations were seen as ground-breaking,
despite the fact that the proposal to eliminate the Special Assistant
Judge System and the expansion of the Research Clerk System in
courts has since then largely failed. Nonetheless, other
recommendations were implemented, including the procedure to
diversify the backgrounds of judicial nominees and provide existent
assistant judges varied legal experiences. Similarly, a JSRC proposal
was implemented to recruit and identify judicial candidates from
the rank of practicing lawyers.
In accordance with the fourth recommendation to increase
citizen participation in court management, the district court councils
27. Id.
28. Id. See Chapter III Part 5 (5) With Regard to How Supreme Court Justices
Should be Appointed, etc.
29. Id. See Chapter III Part 6 Mutual Exchanges Among Legal Professionals.
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were set up and a group of citizens from local communities were
asked to join the independent councils. The council's court
meetings have increased, but a selection process of the members is
not clear and their discussions do not have any binding effects to the
courts. Therefore, the reform objectives to reflect the people's will in
court management and to strengthen the justice system's popular
base have only been partially met. Recommendations regarding the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices (5) and implementation of
mechanisms to promote mutual exchange of legal professions (6)
were hardly put into practice. We will move on to consider the
recommendations on reexamination of the judge appointment
procedures (2) and the personnel system for judges (3).
C. Birth of the Lower CourtJudges Nomination Consultation
Commission
Based on the JSRC recommendations, the Lower Court Judges
Nomination Consultation Commission (hereinafter JNCC) was
established in 2003 based on a Supreme Court rule. 30 The purpose
was to introduce transparency into the judicial selection process and
to reflect the views and opinions of the general citizenry in the
nomination process.
The JNCC is composed of eleven members: two judges, one
public prosecutor, two attorneys and six lay persons. It has eight
regional committees nationwide, of which seven are composed of
five members: three legal professionals and two lay persons.3 ' The
last committee in Tokyo has ten members with the same proportion
of professional and lay participants. 32
Upon consultation with the Supreme Court, the JNCC collects
information on individual candidates from the courts, judges, public
prosecutors, attorneys and its regional committees. The JNCC
decides whether or not each applicant is "adequate" or
"inadequate" by a majority vote and sends its final recommendation

30. See the outline of the JNCC in Daniel H. Foote, Recent Reforms to the Japanese
Judiciary:Real Change or Mere Appearance?, 66 HOUSHAKAIGAKU [SOCIOLOGY OF LAW],
128 (2007); Takayuki li, Nihon ni Okeru Saibankan Sennin Seido no Seiteii: Merit
Selection no Keijyu to Henyou [Repositioning Japanese Judicial Selection System:
Succession and Acculturation of the American Merit Selection], 8 AOMORI L. & POL. ScI.
REV., 8, 62 (2007).
31. li, supranote 2, at 94.
32. Id.
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to the Court.3 3
The efficacy of JNCC's recommendations, however, is still
debated. It is true that the judicial nomination process has become
clearer than before. While non-lawyers represent the majority of the
JNCC members, nonlawyers also include one former Supreme Court
Justice (Chair) and two law professors. All candidates seeking
judicial appointment or reappointment are subject to the
consultation process, while new LTRI graduates are pre-selected by
the court before formally seeking appointment. The JNCC and its
regional committees are tasked with gathering information, but they
have never directly interviewed individual applicants. And while
the JNCC is independent from the Supreme Court, its institutional
function is nearly embedded within the court's nominating process,
and its decision-making procedure is subject to be influenced by the
court. This situation is brought about by the fact that materials used
for selection considerations consist of reports produced by the LTRI
instructors, applicants' summarized evaluations of past ten years by
the chief judge of the candidate's court, and evaluations based on
interviews conducted by the judges in charge of the General
Secretariat of the Supreme Court. In other words, all evaluation
materials are created and supplied by officers who were affiliated
members of the Japanese judiciary.
Recommendations of the JNCC from the Year 2003 to 2011 are
shown on the following table. All JNCC recommendations have
been confirmed in the Supreme Court. Comparing before and after
the establishment of the JNCC, the number of non-nominees is
greater in the latter. It is difficult to interpret this growing number
of rejections, but it is in general becoming harder to take up judicial
appointments.

33. Ii, supra note 2, at 104.
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Table- Recommendations of the Lower Comt Judges Nomination Consultation
Commission from the Year 2003 to 2011: 0 suitable. X not suitable for nomination

2003

Oi101

X8

0173

X6

07

x4

2004

0 108

X7

0:176

X4

02

X2

2005

0124

X9

018

X4

07

XJ1

019

2006

0115

X8

0190

X4

03

X2

027

2007

0118

XT

0203

X4

06

)(6

022

2008

099

X4

0162

X4

08

X3

022

2009

0106

X1

01186

X3

01

X2

Q 13

2010

0102

X2

0188

X2

05

X4

017

102, 'Xf

0194

X4

05

X4

019

2011

0 48

Xl

Source: Summarizedmimltes oftbe JNC-

D. judicialPersonnel Evaluation
The system of judicial personnel evaluation was adopted by a
Supreme Court rule in 2004.34 Nonetheless, the evaluation result
was said to serve as the basis only for the reappointment
considerations, not for the purpose of facilitating the equitable
personnel management of the judiciary.
The appropriate evaluator for the personnel process was
stipulated to be the chief judges of each court, although final
personnel decisions reside in the judicial conference of the Supreme
Court. Due care also must be paid to the external and independent
views from outside of the courts. The courts excluding the Supreme
Court receive a variety of objective views and performative
evaluations of judicial candidates from a variety of individuals
including practicing attorneys, but there is no telling if the final
34. See Takayuki Ii, Saibankan Hycuka Seido no Seibi Katei to Shin Seido no Kentou
[Process of the Establishment of Judicial Evaluation System and Consideration in the New
Sys tern], 4 SHIHoU KAIKAKU CYOIUSASHITSU Hou [RESEARCH OFFICE FOR JUDICIAL
REFORm REVIEW], 99 (2004).
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personnel evaluation submitted by the chief judge will reflect or
incorporate these views and concerns.
The evaluation results of the personnel process are disclosed to
individual judges; however, it appears that judicial candidates will
request disclosure before final personnel decisions are made. While
the complaint procedure is stipulated in the new rule and individual
judges are allowed to make a complaint about evaluations, such a
complaint is treated as a mere individual opinion in the entire
personnel process. The total number of complaints and requests for
evaluation disclosure have not been made public. Some judges who
requested disclosure may worry that even positive evaluations have
little impact on the final outcome due to the absence of both
transparency and effective redress procedures in the personnel
process.

IV. Overall Impact on the Japanese Judiciary
The establishment of the JNCC in 2003 appeared to have
introduced the system of merit selection of judges for the second
time since the end of WWII. 35 Screening by the JNCC for the initial
appointment and reappointment (instead of retention election) in
many ways may resemble the judicial appointment method used in
the U.S. state judicial system with merit selection. However, the
appointment procedure of the lower court judges remains virtually
unchanged. Contrary to the concept of the separation of powers
between the Cabinet and the Supreme Court, in practice, the Court
continues to maintain exclusive authority over the appointment of
lower court judges, which then weakens the independent authority
bestowed upon the JNCC. As a result, the JNCC recommendation
on the appointment and reappointment of judges is almost identical
to the nomination by the Supreme Court, and the appointment by
the Japanese Cabinet.
Rulemaking for the judicial personnel evaluation in 2004 is seen
as the formulation of what is called an open secret of the former
informal practice of the personnel process. However, the result of
personnel evaluation is for the purpose of judicial reappointment
and has virtually no impact on equitable personnel management of
the judiciary, contrary to the original intentions of the JSRC.
The JSRC's reforms on the system of appointment and
35. Ii, supranote 2, at 105.
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personnel evaluation of judges tried to secure a steady supply of
high-quality judges in response to public needs in order for them to
carry out duties with judicial independence. In order to fulfill this
end, the JSCR suggested proposals to introduce a transparent
recruitment practice in pre-screening assistant judges from the rank
of new LTRI graduates. It also recommended a new set of clearly
delineated standards of evaluation by the JNCC, a new appointment
procedure for the Supreme Court Justices, and a clear judicial
personnel management system (e.g., the equitable nationwide
rotation of judges at an interval of three years and appropriate
acceleration of compensation for judges after twenty years of
services).
Do these unclear practices reflect the unique nature of Japan's
judges and court system? John Haley points out that two of the
most significant features of the Japanese judiciary are its
extraordinary record of integrity and its equally remarkable record
of political independence. 36 On the other hand, Daniel H. Foote
proposed that the ideology of "the nameless faceless judiciary"
prevails in Japan, which attaches its importance to the uniformity of
judiciary as a whole rather than independence of respective
individual judges.37 Then, should judicial independence and the
unique qualities of individual judges be abandoned and sacrificed in
exchange for supporting the long-standing judicial status quo with a
seemingly functional Japanese court management system? This is a
critical question that still needs an answer.

V. Conclusion
As we have seen, significant reforms of the judicial system
proposed by the JSRC in the early 21st century could have
established an important mechanism to introduce greater
transparency and accountability into the closed nature of the judicial
system and eliminated the de facto monopoly of judicial authority.
Unfortunately, many JSRC proposals were systematically altered or
removed in the process of rule-making and implementation. And as
36. See Haley, John 0. (2008), The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity,
Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING PolNT 100 (Daniel H.
Foote ed., 2008).
37. See DANIEL H. FOOTE, NA Mo NAI KAo Mo NAI SHIHOU: NIHON No SAIBAN
WA KAWARU NoKA [FACELESS NAMELESS JUDICIARY: WILL JAPANESE JUDICIARY
CHANGE?] (2007).
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a result, there remains virtually an unchanged system of
institutional authority wielded by the Supreme Court and the
judiciary as a whole.
The closed nature of the personnel process and the institutional
structure of the judiciary failed to establish the separation of powers
and a mechanism necessary to create an oversight system of checks
and balances among different branches of the Japanese
government. 38 The failure of effective judicial reforms in the judicial
system led to the persistence of arbitrary judicial personnel
management and the ideology of "the nameless faceless judiciary."
Recently, however, there have been some signs of changes
initiated by some progressive jurists, although such changes have
hardly addressed the necessity for a fundamental restructuring of
the judge system. Nevertheless, a few active Supreme Court Justices
have emerged in recent years, e.g., Shigeo Takii and Tokuji Izumi,
whose rulings have injected new perspectives into previous
traditional and conservative legal rulings. 39 Consequently, public
attention to court rulings has been growing, especially after the
introduction of the Saiban-in trial in 2009, in which three
professional judges and six lay persons sit and adjudicate serious
and violent criminal cases collaboratively.
One possible future scenario is that the initiation of further
reforms on judicial appointment, evaluation systems, and personnel
processes, as well as the new mechanism to relax judicial personnel
management control by the Supreme Court can lead to an increased
independence of individual judges in Japan. An alternative scenario
is that such efforts to reform the judicial system may be largely
meaningless, as evidenced by the failure to implement many
significant proposals suggested by the JSRC in 2001. In either case,
38. Even the change of political power in 2009 from the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) to Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) did not seem to affect the way of
judge appointment and judicial review.
39. See generally SHIGEO TAKII, SAIKOU SAIBANSHO WA KAWATTA KA: ICHI
SAIBANKAN NO JIKO KENSHOU [HAS THE SUPREME COURT CHANGED? SELF-VERIFICATION
BY ONE JUDGE] (2009). For example, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in 2005 that

supported the Tokyo Metropolitan Government's decision to bar a South Korean
civil servant from taking a managerial promotion examination. Both Justices Izumi
and Takii opposed the majority decision, stating that the Japanese government
never set any limits on jobs that resident aliens can hold and thus the Tokyo
Metropolitan government's decision was irrational. See Promotion Just for Japanese:
Supreme Court: South Korean Civil Servant's Suit Fails, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005,
availableat http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20050127al.html.
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we must stand face to face with the "demon" of the closed nature of
the Japanese judiciary, the power and influence of which has the
potential to penetrate into the implementation of the reform process
in the future.

